The Plutarch’s Motive of Descensus Animae in Nag Hammadi and the Corpus Hermeticum by Muñoz Gallarte, Israel
CFC (g): Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos 169 ISSN: 1131-9070
2016, 26 169-178  http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_CFCG.2016.v26.XXXX
The Plutarch’s Motive of Descensus Animae
in Nag Hammadi and the Corpus Hermeticum
Israel Muñoz Gallarte
Universidad de Córdoba
Departamento de Ciencias de la Antigüedad y Edad Media
fg2mugai@uco.es
Recibido: 10-11-2015
Aceptado: 08-12-2015
RESUMEN
Al evaluar los contactos de Plutarco con otras culturas contemporáneas, los investigadores todavía no han llega-
do a un consenso acerca de la relación entre el queronense y la literatura cristiano-primitiva. Un buen ejemplo 
de esto aparece al atender al motivo de la creación del alma humana. La intención de las próximas páginas es, 
tras un análisis de los textos plutarqueos, atender a estos posibles contactos con NHC, los heresiólogos y el 
Corpus Hermeticum a fin de dilucidar sus similitudes y diferencias.
Palabras clave: Plutarco, platonismo, literatura cristiano-primitiva, gnosticismo, NHC, CH, nacimiento del 
alma, antropología, cosmología.
ABSTRACT
In evaluating Plutarch’s contacts with other cultures of his era, scholars have not reached consensus so far 
regarding the relationship between the Chaironean and Early Christian writers. A good example of this lack of 
consensus rises when we come to the views of the creation of human soul. The aim of the following paper is 
to deal with those contacts by, after an analysis of Plutarch’s texts, taking into an account the sources of NHC, 
heresiologists, and also the contemporary Corpus Hermeticum in order to highlight their similitudes and/or dif-
ferences about the motif of the soul’s birth. 
Keywords: Plutarch, Platonism, Early Christian literature, Gnosticism, NHC, CH, Birth of the Soul, Anthro-
pology, Cosmology.
One of the most enduring questions regarding the human being is, beyond all doubt, 
that of the existence of the human soul. Curiously, despite the technological revolution 
of the last century, the approaches to such an issue are still not too distant from those 
of Postclassical Greek literature —and consequently, neither are their conclusions. In-
deed, while neuroscience currently proposes that the individual ego lies in a web of re-
lationships between units in a net of neuronal connexions in the cerebral cortex1, there 
 1 See Fuster (2013).
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is simultaneously no lack of voices relativizing scientific conceptions, such as that of 
Drew Leder in his The Absent Body 2. Leder, in his way, highlights how the human 
being is capable of forgetting his inner body when concentrating on the performance 
of an activity, like sport or study. Moreover, in Leder’s view, the individual only takes 
into an account his material body when he is in a state deemed dysfunctional. There-
fore, as result, the author resurrects the anthropological debate of the supreme soul 
vs. the alien, uncontrollable, obscure human body.
The situation in the second and third centuries of our era was not too different in 
this respect3, but it is still worth taking a look at the responses given then by pagan and 
early Christian literatures. In both cases, there is a distinct attempt to adapt theories 
of the existence of the soul to these cultures’ own philosophical and religious patrons. 
Hence the aim of the following pages is to deal with one of these perpetual questions: 
How does the human soul come to be? Due to Plutarch’s great interest in this issue4, 
we will examine his view – as evidenced mainly in On the Sign of Socrates (590b-
592e), The Slowness of the Divinity (563f-568a), and also in The Face on the Moon 
(943a, 945b-c). In addition, we will focus on, though not limit ourselves to, its possi-
ble relationship with Gnostic literature, as preserved in the Nag Hammadi Corpus and 
the Corpus Hermeticum. This article is therefore organized according to the diverse 
steps that the human soul accomplishes in incarnation, tackling also the anthropologi-
cal, ethical and cosmological implications in order to trace their similarities. The final 
section will draw the emerging conclusions.
At first sight, it is clear that the Plutarchean framework is essentially indebted to the 
Platonic one5, whose main features remain relatively uniform from one work to 
another. According to Plutarch’s De facie, “in the composition of these three factors 
earth furnishes the body, the moon the soul, and the sun furnishes mind” 6. Thus, he 
admittedly establishes the possibility of salvation for all souls, through their participa-
tion in the divine as individual nous7. The only difference between souls, in his view, 
is determined by the status of their nous, namely, whether it is sunk deep into the body 
or is preserved pure and separated from materiality 8. The destiny of the former is rein-
 2 See Leder (1990).
 3 For an overview of Christian literature see, for example, Bovon (2010: 387-406). Festugière 
(1990: 3-15).
 4 Specifically, in the soul’s creation, form, internal dichotomy, substance, origin, and destination, 
scholars such as Brenk (1998: 28-49), Betz (1975), Dillon (2009: 17-24), Roig Lanzillotta (2011: 401-
417) or Van Kooten (2012: 215-233) have already devoted due attention to this matter. For a summary, 
see Hirsch-Luipold (2014: 171-175).
 5 Regarding the differences, see Jones (1916: 58, n. 148); Aguilar Fernández (1981: 286).
 6 Plu. De facie 943a, transl. Cherniss – Helmbold.
 7 See Plu. Quaest. Plat. 1001c. One exception only can be made related to those dissolute souls 
condemned to oblivion, Brenk (1970: 22-23).
 8 See Plu. De genio Socr. 591d-e. There are clear similarities here with the Socrates sketched by 
Plato (Sym. 174e-175b, 220c-d), as Aguilar Fernández points out (1981: 39-40, 152). However, there are 
evident inconsistences when we compare this conception with those of Plu. De facie 943a, and De virt. 
et vit. 408f, in which it is explicitly stated that nous has nothing to do with the body. It also can be seen 
in the Plutarch’s view of the world soul in Plutarch’s De an. procr. 1026c-e (Aguilar Fernández [1981: 
195-196]).
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carnation, until they succeed in keeping passions under control 9. As for the latter, they 
deserve either the reincarnation in special bodies, such as those of prophets or seers10, 
or the definitive transcendence in the sun.
1. THE DUTY OF INCARNATION
Let me now return to the beginning. The first question that the ancient author 
would probably have in mind is, why must the human soul abandon this perfect state, 
in which it is part of the creator? Plutarch did not deal with this question specifically 
in any essay, nor does his conception of it seem unitary. However, we can distinguish, 
on the one hand, a physical argument, based on the soul’s inclination to matter due 
to its intrinsic terrene condition11, and, on the other, as G. Ferrari stated12, an ethical 
hypothesis, according to which the human soul, from the moment of its birth in the 
sun, is inoculated with feelings of guilt. Plutarch describes as it follows: “… arises a 
yearning and desire that draws the soul toward birth (γένεσις), so named as being an 
earthward (ἐπὶ γῆν) inclination (νεῦσις) of the soul”13. In any case, it is obvious that 
the soul is involuntarily expelled from its creator. 
A problem like this one, suitable for theories dependent on Platonic dualism, is also 
echoed in the Gnostic authors of the second and third centuries14, the adduced causes 
being varied and including positives as well as negatives. As far as the positive are 
concerned, for instance, the school of Taurus, following the Timaeus 41b 7, proposed 
that souls should descend in order to manage the material world15. Plutarch’s option, 
meanwhile, even if it is also traced back to other Platonic foundations16, nonetheless 
bears similarities to those of other authors, who explained the descensus animae as an 
event due to an original fall of the human soul. A good example of these theories can 
be encountered in The Tripartite Tractate: “As for the material substance, its way is 
different and in many forms, and it was a weakness which existed in many types of 
inclination” 17.
 9 See Plu. De genio Socr. 593d; De facie 943d, 945b; De sera num. 565b, 565c-d. Regarding the 
relationship of the pureness of these souls and their movement, see Plu. De sera num. 564a; also Pl. Phdr. 
247b.
 10 As it is the example of Hermodorus of Clazomenas, Plu. De genio Socr. 592c. This assertion is no 
doubt related to that of De facie 944d-e. See also Cherniss (21968: 211 n. f). Regarding this division in 
NHC, see Trip.Trac. (NHC I 5) 118,30-119,10.
 11 See Alt (1983: 21-23). 
 12 See Ferrari (1988: 135). Celsus agrees in Origenes, Cels. VIII 53. 
 13 Plu. De sera 566a, transl. De Lacy – Einarson; De genio Socr. 590e-f.
 14 As well as Plotin and Iamblicus. See Festugière (1990: 69-72).
 15 In the same way, C.H. IV 2 (49.10) and Ascl. 10 (308.13). See also Festugière (1990: 72-74).
 16 Pl. Phdr. 246b-d, 249a. See also Festugière (1990: 78-79).
 17 Trip.Trac. (NHC I 5) 106, 10, transl. Attridge – Mueller. As well as in Zost. (NHC VIII 1) 1, 20; 
Macr. In somm. Scip. II.11; Kore kosmou 35, 3-4; Plot. IV 8, 5.16; ἁμαρτία in Iamb. Protr. 380.9-12. See 
also Jonas (2000: 97, 186).
172 CFC (g): Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos
2016, 26 169-178
The Plutarch’s Motive of Descensus Animae in Nag Hammadi…Israel Muñoz Gallarte
2. INSEMINATION IN THE MOON
Almost unanimously, Plutarch’s works begin the process of incarnation with the 
insemination of solar nous in the moon18: “the substance of the soul is left upon 
the moon (λείπεται δ᾽ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἐπὶ τῆς σελήνης) and retains certain vestiges 
and dreams of life as it were” 19. With the exception of these “vestiges and dreams” 
of a previous life, as F. Brenk correctly notes, Plutarch does not mention any previ-
ous vision of Platonic Forms20. Instead, the Chaeronean seems to resolve the problem 
through the idea of homoiosis theo: this states that the soul’s creator must be an ethi-
cal model to his own creation, imposing upon the soul the requirement to guard these 
values as a conditio sine qua non for definitive reunion after death21, or just for letting 
the soul partake of the creator’s nature 22. What is certain is that the descent of the nous 
to the moon marks the beginning of life for the human soul, as well as the beginning 
of the influence of heimarmene 23.
Just as in Plutarch, we read, mainly (though not exclusively) in gnostic sources, 
that the conception of God as a luminous creator of souls through his seed is widely 
attested 24, as in On the Origin of the World 25: “Cast his seed upon the midst of the 
navel of the earth […] his body being indeed like their body, but his appearance like 
the man (of light) who had shown himself to them”. In this sense, God not only cre-
ates the personal nous of the individual, but also uses the homoiosis theo in order to 
render him partaker of his divine nature 26. Likewise, in the first of The Three Steles of 
Seth, the soul’s dependence from its creator is described in the same terms: “And thou 
 18 See Pl. Ti. 41e-42d. Regarding its relationship with Plutarch’s works, consult Cherniss (21968: 219 
n. f); Elkaisy-Friemuth – Dillon (2009: 2-3).
 19 Plutarch in De facie 944f and 945c (transl. Cherniss – Helmbold) —see also De E 393d and De 
genio Socr. 591b-c—, resembles the insemination located by Plato’s Timaeus 41-42 on the stars. The sun 
is called Atropos in De facie and the invisible in De genio Socr. The source for De facie and De genio 
Socr. should be Laws 960c, but, due to the order of De fato, namely, Clotho, Atropo, and Laquesis, the 
source of the latter should be R. 617c; see Cherniss (21968: 221 n. b). See also Festugière (1990: 15-16). 
 20 See Brenk (1998: 42 n. 41). It is always a pleasant experience in Plato’s view, Phaidr. 248c-e, 
250b; R. 614d-615a; Ti. 41e.
 21 See Plu. De sera 550D; De genio Socr. 591b.
 22 See Plu. Quaest. Plat. 1001C. See also Pl. Ti. 736b 38; “analogous to that element of which the 
stars are made” (Brenk [1998: 41 and n. 39]).
 23 See Pl. Phaidr. 247-250. See also, Elkaisy-Friemuth – Dillon (2009: 4); Brenk (1998: 39-40); Jonas 
(2000: 185). However, there is in Plutarch no process by which the stars endow souls with qualities as 
presents before birth, but this may be based on the way in which Plutarch conceives of souls on the moon 
as already “mixed and intermediate things” in this state, Plu. De facie 945d.
 24 See Ap.John (NHC II 1) 31, BG 19, 36; HipArc (NHC II 4) 96, 20. Also the Christian authors of 
Late Antiquity, as Aeneas of Gaza, Thphr. p. 39, II. 20-25. See also Krausmüller (2009: 56); about the 
caveat for Christians in accepting the notion of a pre-existential soul at 63.
 25 See NHC II 5, 114 (162), transl. Bethge – Layton.
 26 See CH, I 12-15; Trip.Trac. (NHC I 5) I, 105, 20-30; Ap.John (NHC II 1) 14, 20-30; 15, 10-20; 
19, 20-30; ParaphShem (NHC VII 1) 24.15-30; TeachSilv (NHC VII, 4) 92.23-26; Ap.John (NHC II 1) 
6, 10-30. See also Festugière (1990: 28). About the implications of the idea of redemption, see Rudolph 
(1984: 94-95). On the reception of this topic in Late Antiquity, see Krausmüller (2009: 59-60).
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art my mind, O my Father. And I, I sowed and begot […] Thou art light, since thou 
beholdest light. Thou hast revealed light”27. 
Here again, as in Plutarch’s works, there is an intermediate place, generally femi-
nine —Sophia, Mother, Ogdoad— which souls must go through in their descent and 
ascension28. This intermediate place between sun and earth, also known as moon, can 
be found in On the Origin of the World: “then Justice created Paradise, being beauti-
ful and being outside the orbit of the moon and the orbit of the sun in the Land of 
Wantonness” 29.
3. THE IMPRESSION OF THE SHAPE IN THE SOUL
Still on the question of the soul’s origin, Plutarch states in De sera that, right after 
the insemination, the intellect impresses itself upon the shape of psyche (τυποῦσα), 
and the latter, in turn, enfolds the body on all sides, moulding it (ἐκμάττεται τὸ εἶδος). 
Thence, although the parts would be separated for a long time, they preserve each oth-
ers’ likeness and imprint 30.
This idea of the nous moulding the image of psyche and, consequently, the figure 
of the body, appears also in Jewish sources, such as Philo of Alexandria. He writes, 
regarding the two “powers” —namely, the two parts of the soul— almost in the same 
terms as Plutarch, that “this (scil. pneuma) is not just air in motion, but rather a sort 
of impression and stamp (typon kai kharaktera) of the divine power, to which Moses 
gives the appropriate title of ‘image’ (eikon)” 31.
4. THE MOON
In the second step of the generation of human soul, the moon provokes the soul’s 
second birth, via the adhesion of psyche to the nous 32. Indeed, De sera, De genio and 
De facie concur in designating a chasm or depth (μυχός)33 in the moon that attracts the 
soul as the main location for its future. This chasm is surely the earth’s shadow, ending 
 27 See Thr.St.Seth (NHC VII) 118, 30-119, 10, transl. Robinson. There are other systems, such as 
that where light, in the form of the heavenly “man”, falls directly into the earthly body of Adam. See also 
Rudolph (1984: 106). Regarding the topic of being sown, see also the Panarion of Epiphanius 26.3.1; 
Roig Lanzillotta (2007: 228-229).
 28 See Jonas (2000: 77-78, 214-215). Regarding the influence of indo-iranian conceptions, see Piñero – 
Montserrat Torrens – García Bazán (1997: 92).
 29 Orig.World (NHC II 5) 110, 1-10, transl. Bethge – Layton.
 30 Plu. De facie 945a, 944f. It is called εἴδωλον, with certain reminiscences of Homer’s nomencla-
ture. See also Plu. De sera 565d: εἶδος. Cherniss (21968: 216-217 n. b) points out to Pl. Ti. 34b. See also 
about this process Plu. Quaest. Plat. 1002f; Pl. Ti. 30b. 
 31 Ph. Comm. Deut. 82-83, transl. Colson – Whitaker; Leg. All. II 6; Spec. Leg. I 333, and Plu. De 
facie 943a. See also Dillon (2009: 18-22).
 32 See Plu. De facie 945d.
 33 See Plu. De facie 944a-c, and its charms at 945c; De genio Socr. 590f; De Is. et Os. 362a-b; De def. or. 
437; Amatorius 766b. Regarding the connection of Hecate with the moon, see Cherniss (21968: 209 n. g).
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at the upper limit of the sublunary region34 and, in spite of its pleasant appearance, it 
nevertheless provokes the dissolution of the intellect (τὸ φρονοῦν)35, the reanimation 
of the irrational and corporal parts of the soul (τὸ δὲ ἄλογον καὶ σωματοειδές) and, 
consequently, its aiming to be born in the earth (γένεσιν). Plutarch explains this pro-
cess in physical terms, as a result of the soul’s increasing weight due to the chasm’s 
humid atmosphere36.
The same abode seems to be described by Plutarch in De genio (590c), but in a 
manner closer to Plato’s view. On this occasion, Timarchus contemplates islands 
“illuminated by one another with soft fire, taking on now one colour, now another, like 
a dye, as the light kept varying with their mutations” 37. These islands would be icono-
graphical portrayals of individual souls waiting for incarnation or transcendence, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, planets that Plutarch could have seen as “countless”, 
some “huge in size” and “not all equal”, but “alike round”, floating in an unstable sea 
or lake 38. As well as in De sera, Plutarch expounds that, when this sea moves and the 
soul-islands adopt a spiral movement, the area bends over its centre, causing the fall 
of souls to earth and, in this manner, their birth39.
The cosmological conception of Gnosticism is close to Plutarch’s in more than one 
way, as both understand that the seven planets —Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, 
and Moon—, together with the fixed stars, are located somewhere in the distance 
between God and earth40. Their aim is to join together the noetic part of the soul with 
the psychic one, as can be seen in the Apocryphon of John 41, whose author gives a 
thorough description of how the seven planets provide the soul with its diverse terres-
trial capacities, as providence, divinity, lordship, fire, kingdom, insight, and wisdom 
successively, in its descent to earth42.
Curiously, the second image of Plutarch also appears in gnostic literature, such as, 
for instance, the Naassene Homily. The flow from the heavenly to the earthly ocean 
signifies the coming into being of men, and, just as in Plutarch, the route in the opposite 
direction is that of gods, to wit, of those men who obtain a higher level of perfection: 
“it is Ocean —birth-causing of gods and birth-causing of men— flowing and ebbing 
forever, now up and now down. When Ocean flows down (he says), it is the birth-
 34 See De Lacy – Einarson (1959: 178).
 35 For Plutarch, as well as for Xenocrates and Philo, Hades is the entire area between earth and moon 
(Dillon [2009: 23-24, and n. 13]). 
 36 See Plu. De sera 566a. See also Aguilar Fernández (1981: 8-10). Plutarch also follows this con-
ception in other works, such as De Is. et. Os. 382d; De def. or. 432d-e; as a light in Quaest. Rom. 281b, 
and De lat. viv. 1130b. Regarding the Plutarch’s heritage from Heraclitus, see Aguilar Fernández (1981: 
57-58).
 37 Transl. De Lacy – Einarson; See also Plu. De sera 563f.
 38 See Plu. De genio Socr. 590f, transl. De Lacy – Einarson; De Is. et Os. 359d.
 39 See Plu. De genio Socr. 591c; Fr. 177Sandbach (Soury [1942: 217 n. 1, and 156, n. 1]; des Places 
[1950: 66 n. 1]; Vernière [1977: 183]). This anthropological conception of human birth implies a cosmo-
logical one, by which we can understand that the cosmos is divided into four sections, as has been already 
pointed out by Aguilar Fernández (1981: 36); see also De Lacy – Einarson (1959: 467 n. d).
 40 See, for example, the detailed description of Mars. (NHC X 1) 1-5, 10. 
 41 See Pap. Ber. 48,4-51,5. Also in Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 1.29.4. See Roig Lanzillotta (2007: 195-196). 
 42 Also in the Mandean texts, as Left Ginza 1 2. See Rudolph (1984: 67, 102 and 113).
CFC (g): Estudios griegos e indoeuropeos 175
2016, 26 169-178
The Plutarch’s Motive of Descensus Animae in Nag Hammadi…Israel Muñoz Gallarte
causing of men; and when [it flows] up, towards the Wall and Palisade, and the ‘White 
Rock’, it is the birth-causing of gods” 43.
5. THE ABYSS
Moreover, Plutarch describes the abyss that should be seen as an entrance and exit 
for human souls like a liminal place through which pass not only new souls created 
by the sun’s seed, but also those that come back from their sublunary existence, “like 
from exile to homeland”44. If they have not being rejected and shaken by the moon, 
the latter receive here their final arrangements, either for another incarnation or for a 
definitive transcendence45.
In this respect, the idea of transmigration, or transomation 46, of the soul is not alien 
to Gnosis 47. Indeed, as in Plutarch’s writings, the decanting of the soul from one body 
to another is widespread, especially as punishment for unawakened souls 48. Thus, for 
example, the Apocryphon of John assumes that “after they are born, then, when the 
Spirit of life increases and the power comes and strengthens that soul, no one can lead 
it astray with works of evil”; however, “the souls of those who did not do this work” 
will be rejected, just like the moon in Plutarch: “they (scil. the archons) bind it with 
chains and cast it into prison, and consort with it until it is liberated from the forgetful-
ness and acquires knowledge” 49.
6. THE DEFINITIVE INCARNATION
The final step in the creation of the soul is the materialization of psyche and nous in 
the form of the human body. Both Gnosticism50 and Plutarch51 conceive this moment 
as the act of coming into a cage, jail, or tomb52, due to the fact that it also means being 
 43 Hyppol. Refutatio V 7, 36, transl. MacMahon. See also Rudolph (1984: 93-94).
 44 See Plu. De facie 943d, transl. Cherniss – Helmbold; De gen. Socr. 591c; De sera 565e-566a 
(Aguilar Fernández [1981: 54-55, 71]). The vocabulary preserves certain similarities to that of De genio, 
and both would at least point to Plato’s Phaedrus 248a-b.
 45 See Plu. De sera 565d; De facie 944f. 
 46 It is conceived, just as in Plutarch, in three successive steps: “They descend from the third. They bless 
the second; after this the first”, Thr.St.Seth (NHC VII) 127, 19-21, transl. Robinson; Ap.John (NHC II 1) 
4,17-19. See also Roig Lanzillotta (2011: 410). Again, there is a tradition in which a female divinity, being 
sophia or sophia zoe, ends the act of soul’s creation of the demiurge, giving birth to the human being by 
uniting his soul and his nous, as well as Plutarch’s moon; see Orig.World (NHC II 5) 114 (162), 24-115 
(163), 115 (163), 30-121 (169), 35. See also Rudolph (1984: 98-100).
 47 See Orbe (1976: 573-597).
 48 See Rudolph (1984: 103).
 49 See Ap.John (NHC II,1) 26,9-27,10; 27,11-21, transl. Wisse.
 50 See F. Bovon (2010: 398-399).
 51 As punishment in Plu. De sera 564e, 567f; as a cage, for example, in Cons. ad ux. 611f. See also 
Pl. Phd. 82C-83a; Brenk (1998: 29-30 and n. 5).
 52 See Roig Lanzillotta (2007: 233-235).
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in contact with passions, which inevitably distances the nous from its creator. In this 
sense, the Apocryphon of John explicitly asserts about the body that “This is the fet-
ter, this is the tomb of the creature of the body, which was put upon man as a fetter of 
matter” 53. As a result of being far from its goal, the soul feels alienated. Similarly to 
Plutarch, the Apocryphal Acts of Andrew states: “and precisely that which the intellect 
suffered together with her when it was shattered and alienated (ἀπολισθήσας) from 
itself” 54.
7. CONCLUSIONS
After the exposition and analysis of the presented information, it would be, in my 
view, problematic to accept that the similarities between Plutarch’s conceptions and 
Gnostic ideas on the descensus animae are mere chance coincidences. However, cer-
tain other possibilities, not mutually exclusive, also suggest themselves:
— Here one must of course emphasize that Plutarch and the aforementioned Gnos-
tic examples are turning their attention to some of the most intellectual sources 
of their age —a koiné philosophique 55, in Festugière’s words. In this philo-
sophical mixture can be seen traces of Orphism, Pythagoras, and, most of all, 
Platonism.
— Secondly, Plato’s statements concerning with anthropology, ethics, and cos-
mology —especially those of Timaeus and Phaedrus— are based on several fun-
damental elements, such as the radical separation between the material world 
from the superior or spiritual one; that matter be understood as a stage where the 
soul is compelled to live under the influence of tyche and passions; and, finally, 
the existence of an intermediate place56.
However, there are other innovative solutions, both different from those of Plato 
and common to Plutarch and Gnostic literature that do not point only to the influence 
of Aristotle and Xenocrates, among others 57, but also possibly to a common inspiration, 
that should be further explored.
 53 See Ap.John (NHC II, 1) 21, 10, transl. Wisse; Zost. (NHC VIII 1) 46, 1-10. See also Rudolph 
(1984: 103).
 54 See Vr 78-79, transl. Roig Lanzillotta; see also Roig Lanzillotta (2007: 227).
 55 See Festugière (1990: 2).
 56 See Jonas (2000: 217, n. 137).
 57 See Roig Lanzillotta (2007: 223-226).
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